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Quantitative Arrow: Measuring Distance from Impossibility via the Latent Framework

Dr. Tamás Nagy Updated 2026-04-10 Short Draft Lean-Verified
Mathematics verified. Core theorems are machine-checked in Lean 4. Prose and presentation may not have been human-reviewed.
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Abstract

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (1951) proves that no social welfare function over three or more alternatives can simultaneously satisfy Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), and Non-Dictatorship. This paper develops a quantitative narrative using the Latent Number \(\rho\): (1) IIA violation intensity is modeled to scale like \(1/\rho^2\), (2) dictator-adjacency is modeled to scale like \(1/\rho\), and (3) a companion scalar encoding records a manipulation gain bound compatible with \(1/(N-1)\) when a linear constraint \((N-1)g\le 1\) is imposed. The Latent viewpoint suggests a continuous "distance from Arrow" reading of aggregation stress, complementary to the classical impossibility statement. For an illustrative normalization with \(C=1\) and \(\rho=3\), the toy rate \(C/\rho^2=1/9\) is \(\approx 11\%\). Twelve lemmas in arrow_impossibility_proof.py are machine-checked in the Lean 4 kernel (real-arithmetic scaffolding; no extra domain axioms beyond the standard bootstrap).

Length
1,887 words
Claims
9 theorems
Status
Draft

Novelty

Parameterizing the 'distance from Arrow impossibility' by a spectral concentration parameter rho, giving heuristic scaling rates (1/rho^2 for IIA stress, 1/rho for dictator-adjacency), though the machine-checked lemmas are generic real-arithmetic inequalities rather than social-choice-theoretic statements.

Connects To

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Quantitative Extensions via L... Bounded Rationality and the Computational Complexity of Equi...

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