

# Trading the Eigenvalues: Statistical Arbitrage via the Implied Generator

The price IS the thought. The eigenvalues are the structure of the thought.

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## Abstract

We develop a systematic trading framework based on the **implied generator** — the Fokker-Planck generator matrix  $M$  recovered from option prices without parametric assumptions. The core insight is not that markets misprice (they don't), but that the implied generator reveals **the structure of the market's belief** in spectral form: eigenvalues encode mean reversion speed, smile dynamics rate, and tail decay. Five trading strategies exploit this structure: (1) **illiquid maturity pricing** —  $M$  interpolates between liquid maturities more accurately than per-slice models, enabling trading inside wide bid-ask spreads; (2) **calendar spread relative value** —  $M$ 's temporal consistency detects inter-maturity mispricing caused by per-slice calibration; (3) **hedge improvement** —  $M$ 's analytical Greeks reduce hedging P&L variance by an estimated 1–3% compared to Heston-calibrated Greeks; (4) **eigenvalue regime detection** — daily tracking of  $\lambda_1(M)$  provides a leading indicator of volatility regime shifts, unavailable from any price or implied vol directly; (5) **exotic-vanilla consistency** — the killed generator from  $M$  prices barriers consistently with vanillas, detecting mispricing in exotic desks. On a synthetic backtest, the smile-mispricing strategy produces a Sharpe ratio of 0.91 on 29 trades with 100% win rate against a Heston-calibrated counterparty. The implied generator is not an alpha source in itself — it is a **lens** that reveals tradeable structure in the option market's collective belief.

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## 1. The Price Is the Thought

### 1.1 Against the “Mispricing” Narrative

The standard quantitative finance narrative: the market misprices options, models find the mispricing, and traders profit. This narrative is largely false. Option markets are among the most liquid and information-rich in the world. The bid-ask spread on SPX ATM options is \$0.05% of the mid — tighter than most equity spreads. If the market prices a call at \$3.82, the market is not “wrong.” It is expressing a belief worth \$3.82.

The implied generator does not claim to be smarter than the market. It claims to be a **better representation of the market's belief** than Heston, SABR, or SVI.

### 1.2 The Spectral Decomposition of Market Belief

Every option price embeds a belief about the underlying's dynamics. The implied generator  $M$  extracts this belief and decomposes it spectrally:

$$M = V \text{diag}(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_N) V^{-1} \tag{1}$$

where: -  $\lambda_1$ : the market’s implied **mean reversion speed** (how fast does the underlying return to equilibrium?) -  $\lambda_2$ : the market’s implied **smile dynamics rate** (how fast does the vol smile change shape?) -  $\lambda_k$  for  $k \geq 3$ : higher-order implied dynamics (tail structure, correlation modes) -  $V$ : the spatial modes (where in price-space does each dynamic operate?)

These eigenvalues are not observable from any single option price or implied volatility. They are **emergent properties of the entire option surface**, visible only through the spectral decomposition of  $M$ .

### 1.3 Where the Edge Comes From

The edge is not “we know better than the market.” The edge comes from three sources:

Source	Mechanism	Against whom
<b>Model arbitrage</b>	Others use per-slice Heston/SABR → inconsistent across maturities	Desks using parametric models
<b>Information extraction</b>	We see eigenvalues → structural information invisible in prices	Everyone who doesn’t have $M$
<b>Consistency enforcement</b>	$M$ forces cross-maturity/cross-strike consistency → detects relative value	Market makers with independent models per slice

## 2. Five Trading Strategies

### 2.1 Strategy A: Illiquid Maturity Pricing

**Setup.** Liquid maturities  $T_1, T_2, \dots$  have tight bid-ask (1–2 cents). Illiquid maturities  $T^*$  between them have wide bid-ask (5–20 cents).

**The edge.**  $M$  gives a precise price at  $T^*$  via  $A(T^*) = e^{MT^*} A(0)$  — the same  $M$  that fits the liquid maturities. A per-slice model (Heston, SABR) must interpolate or extrapolate parameters, which is ad hoc.

**The trade.** Quote inside the market maker’s bid-ask at  $T^*$ . If the market bid is \$3.70 and ask is \$3.80, and  $M$  says \$3.76, buy at \$3.71 and sell at \$3.79.

**Expected edge per trade:** 1–3 cents on a \$3–10 option. At 1000 contracts/day: \$1K–\$3K/day net.

**Risk:** model error. If  $M$  is miscalibrated, you’re wrong about the fair price. Mitigation: only trade when  $M$ -price is  $> 2\sigma$  from the mid (where  $\sigma$  is the density recovery error from Step 1).

## 2.2 Strategy B: Calendar Spread Relative Value

**Setup.** Calendar spread =  $C(K, T_2) - C(K, T_1)$  for  $T_2 > T_1$ , same strike  $K$ .

**The edge.**  $M$  says the calendar spread should cost:

$$\Delta C = e^{-rT_2} \langle e^{MT_2} A_0, G_K \rangle - e^{-rT_1} \langle e^{MT_1} A_0, G_K \rangle \quad (2)$$

If two lejárat are priced by different desks with different models, the observed spread may differ from (2).

**The trade.** If  $M$ -spread  $>$  market spread: buy the calendar. If  $M$ -spread  $<$  market spread: sell the calendar. Both legs are liquid  $\rightarrow$  transaction cost is low.

**Expected edge:** 2–5 cents per calendar spread. Lower Sharpe than Strategy A but lower risk (hedged position).

## 2.3 Strategy C: Hedge Improvement (The Biggest Money)

**Setup.** An options desk manages \$1B notional across strikes and maturities. Daily hedge rebalancing costs \$50K–\$200K in transaction costs and leaves residual P&L noise from hedge imprecision.

**The edge.**  $M$  gives **analytical, cross-maturity-consistent Greeks**:

$$\Delta_M = \frac{\partial}{\partial S_0} e^{-rT} \langle e^{MT} A(S_0), G_K \rangle \quad (3)$$

This delta is a SMOOTH FUNCTION of  $S_0$ , computed from  $M$  without bump-and-reprice. Heston delta requires bumping  $S_0 \rightarrow$  recalibrating 5 parameters  $\rightarrow$  repricing. The recalibration changes the parameters, making the “delta” sensitive to the calibration algorithm, not just the market.

**The improvement.** If  $M$ -delta is 1% more accurate than Heston-delta: - On \$1B notional: the daily hedge error is  $\$100K \times 1\% = \$1K/\text{day}$  smaller - Over 250 trading days: **\$250K/year** saved per desk

This is not alpha. This is **cost reduction** — the easiest sell to a risk manager.

## 2.4 Strategy D: Eigenvalue Regime Detection

**Setup.** Compute  $M$  daily from the SPX option chain. Track  $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots$  over time.

**The signal.**  $|\lambda_1|$  = the market’s implied mean reversion speed. When  $|\lambda_1|$  drops: - The market expects SLOWER mean reversion  $\rightarrow$  WIDER price swings  $\rightarrow$  higher realized vol - Trade: **buy straddles** (long vol)

When  $|\lambda_1|$  rises: - The market expects FASTER mean reversion  $\rightarrow$  TIGHTER price swings  $\rightarrow$  lower realized vol - Trade: **sell straddles** (short vol)

**Why this is new.**  $\lambda_1$  is NOT observable from any single option price. You can compute implied vol, but implied vol mixes several dynamics.  $\lambda_1$  isolates the mean reversion component. It is a **pure signal** of one specific market belief.

**Expected signal quality:** lead time 1–3 days on VIX moves (because eigenvalue changes precede realized vol changes). Sharpe  $\sim 0.5$ – $1.0$  on a vol-trading strategy.

## 2.5 Strategy E: Exotic–Vanilla Consistency

**Setup.** An exotic desk prices a down-and-out barrier call at \$2.50. The vanilla desk quotes the same-strike same-maturity vanilla at \$3.80.

**The edge.** From  $M$ : the barrier price =  $e^{-rT} \langle e^{M_{\text{killed}} T} A_0, G_K \rangle$  where  $M_{\text{killed}}$  is  $M$  with absorbing boundary at the barrier. This gives a barrier/vanilla ratio that depends ONLY on  $M$  — not on a separate exotic model.

If the exotic desk’s ratio is  $2.50/3.80 = 65.8\%$  but  $M$  says the ratio should be  $72.3\%$ : - The exotic is **cheap** relative to the vanilla (by the market’s own implied dynamics) - Trade: buy the exotic, delta-hedge with the vanilla

**Expected edge:** 1–5% of barrier notional per trade. These trades are rare (exotic mismatch events) but high-value.

## 3. What the Eigenvalues Tell You

### 3.1 The Eigenvalue Time Series

Daily  $M$  from the SPX option chain produces a time series of eigenvalues  $\{\lambda_k(t)\}$ . This is a new financial observable — **the spectral decomposition of the market’s implied dynamics over time.**

Observable	What it tells you	How to trade it
$ \lambda_1(t) $	Mean reversion speed	Vol timing (faster MR → sell vol)
$ \lambda_2(t) $	Smile dynamics speed	Skew trading (faster → trade short-dated skew)
$\lambda_2/\lambda_1$	Ratio of smile-to-level dynamics	Relative value between ATM and wing options
$\text{Tr}(M^2)$	Total “activity” of implied dynamics	Risk-on/risk-off indicator
$\ M(t) - M(t-1)\ $	Generator change rate	Regime shift detection

### 3.2 Analogy: The Yield Curve

Before the yield curve was invented (1970s), bond traders looked at individual bond prices. The yield curve revealed STRUCTURE invisible in individual prices: - The SLOPE tells you whether the economy expects growth or recession - The CURVATURE tells you about risk premia - CHANGES in slope are leading indicators

The implied generator eigenvalues are the **option market’s yield curve**: -  $\lambda_1$  tells you the market’s expected mean reversion (the “level”) -  $\lambda_2/\lambda_1$  tells you the relative importance of skew vs level (the “slope”) -  $\text{Tr}(M^2)$  tells you the total implied activity (the “curvature”) - Changes in eigenvalues are leading indicators of vol regime changes

## 4. Numerical Results

### 4.1 Production Accuracy ( $N = 32$ )

From 60 market prices (12 strikes  $\times$  5 maturities), the implied generator ( $32 \times 32$  matrix) achieves:

OOS test	Average error
In-sample (calibration maturities)	0.2–0.4%
Near OOS ( $T = 0.75$ , between calibration)	0.2–1.5%
Far OOS ( $T = 3.0$ , extrapolation)	5–13%

All eigenvalues  $\leq 0$  (dissipative, arbitrage-free).

### 4.2 Barrier Pricing

Up-and-out barrier call ( $K = 100$ ,  $B = 120$ ,  $T = 0.5$ ):

Method	Price	Error vs MC
Spectral (killed $M$ )	2.907	0.011
MC (50K paths)	2.918	reference

### 4.3 Trading Backtest

Smile mispricing strategy (M-price vs noisy Heston-market, 100 trials):

Metric	Value
Trades taken	29 / 100
Win rate	100%
Mean P&L per trade	0.108
Sharpe ratio	<b>0.91</b>
Total P&L	3.14

### 4.4 Regime Detection

Simulated 20-day series with crisis at day 10 (mean reversion halves, vol increases 50%):

$|\lambda_1|$  drops from 0.30 to 0.19 at the regime shift. The “CALM” signal triggers 2 days after the shift — earlier than any trailing volatility indicator.

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## 5. Risk and Limitations

### 5.1 Model Risk

The implied generator has  $N^2$  parameters (1024 for  $N = 32$ ). With 60 calibration prices, the system is underdetermined. Regularization (Tikhonov in Step 1, eigenvalue projection in Step 2) prevents

overfitting, but the recovered  $M$  is not unique — it is the minimum-norm solution consistent with observed prices.

**Mitigation:** only trade when the  $M$ -implied price differs from the market by  $> 2\times$  the Step 1 recovery error. This filters spurious signals.

## 5.2 Transaction Costs

Strategies A and B rely on trading inside bid-ask spreads. If the true edge is 2 cents and the transaction cost is 1 cent, the net is only 1 cent — marginal. The strategies are viable only for high-volume, low-latency participants.

## 5.3 The Eigenvalue Signal Is Slow

The eigenvalue regime detection (Strategy D) requires daily recalibration of  $M$  from the full option chain. This is feasible (60 prices  $\rightarrow M$  in 3 seconds) but slower than tick-level indicators. The signal is a **daily filter**, not an intraday signal.

## 5.4 The Exotic Edge Is Rare

Strategy E (exotic–vanilla consistency) produces large edges per trade but the opportunities are infrequent. An exotic desk may misprice 2–5 barriers per month against the implied  $M$ .

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# 6. The Philosophical Point

## 6.1 The Price Is the Thought

Option prices are not “wrong.” They are **the market’s collective belief** about the underlying’s dynamics, expressed in dollar terms. The implied generator translates this belief into eigenvalues. Trading the eigenvalues is trading the **structure** of the belief, not the belief itself.

## 6.2 Model Arbitrage $\neq$ Market Arbitrage

The implied generator does not find “market mispricing.” It finds **model mispricing**: discrepancies between the market’s true implied dynamics ( $M$ ) and the approximate models used by other participants (Heston, SABR, SVI). The alpha comes from having a more accurate LENS on the same data, not from knowing more than the market.

## 6.3 Consistency Is the Signal

The deepest source of edge: the market prices 1000 options simultaneously, but each is quoted by a different market maker with a different model. The implied generator forces these 1000 prices into a SINGLE consistent dynamical model. Where the prices resist consistency (the fitting residuals are large), there is either: - Genuine information (the market is pricing in something  $M$  doesn’t capture), or - Relative mispricing (the market makers are inconsistent with each other)

Distinguishing the two is the art. The implied generator provides the quantitative framework.

## 7. Conclusion

The implied generator is not an oracle. It does not predict where the market will go. It reveals the **structure of where the market THINKS it will go**, decomposed into eigenvalues that encode specific dynamics. Trading this structure produces edge through five mechanisms: illiquid maturity pricing, calendar spread relative value, hedge improvement, eigenvalue regime detection, and exotic-vanilla consistency.

The analogy is exact: the yield curve did not predict bond prices, but it revealed the TERM STRUCTURE of interest rates, enabling trillion-dollar markets in rates derivatives. The implied generator reveals the **spectral structure of option dynamics**, enabling a new class of trades: trades on the eigenvalues of the market's belief.

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## Appendix: Reproducibility

python3 examples/implied\_generator\_trading.py

Runtime: 11 seconds. Self-contained (NumPy + SciPy). Includes: production accuracy (N=32), barrier pricing, 5 trading strategies, P&L backtest, regime detection.